Here is a friendly reminder to make sure you always read the instructions for each assignment. With our case studies, you will never have to respond to every question. For Case Study One, you only need to respond to questions One and Five. Please submit your paper in a Word document (no PDFs please, this is because I may need to use the track changes feature in Word while grading). Insuring Uber’s App-On Gap
You should have a cover page, body, and reference page. Do not include the actual questions from the case. Please keep in mind that each response should be in paragraph format and be between 250 and 300 words in length. (So for Case One, 250-300 words for Q1 and 250-300 words for Q5.) Insuring Uber’s App-On Gap
Case One also asks that you integrate the core values of Community and Respect into your response. Finally, be sure to use proper in-text citations, for example when using the book: (Lawrence & Weber, 2017, p. 20).The subsequent reference at the end will be: Lawrence, A.T., & Weber, J. (2017). Business and Society: Stakeholders, Ethics, Public Policy (15th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill/Create Custom Insuring Uber’s App-On Gap
Case Study 1, For Case Study One, you only need to respond to questions One and Five.
1) What is the focal organization in this case and what is the main issue it faces?
5) Based on the information you have draft a stakeholder map of this case. What conclusions can you draw from the stakeholder map?
Discussion Case: Insuring Uber’s App-On Gap, at the end of Chapter 1.
Respond to Discussion Questions 1 and 5 and submit to the Assignment box by no later than Sunday 11:59 PM EST/EDT. (This Assignment may be linked to Turnitin.)
Keep in mind to integrate the core values of Community and Respect that apply to this issue. Responses for each case discussion question should be in paragraph form and be approximately 250-300 words in length.
Discussion Case : Insuring Uber’s App-On Gap
At around 8 p.m. on the evening on December 31, 2013, a mother and her two young children
were walking home in San Francisco. At a busy intersection, the family waited for the “walk”
signal and then started across the street. Just then, an SUV made a right turn, striking all three
members of the family in the crosswalk. The mother and her 5-year-old son were seriously
injured. Her 6-year-old daughter was killed. The man behind the wheel of the SUV identified
himself as a driver for the ride-hailing service Uber.
Uber immediately distanced itself from the tragedy, saying that the driver was “not providing
services on the Uber system at the time of the accident.” The family’s attorney contested this,
saying that the driver was logged onto the Uber application, appeared on the system as
available to accept a rider, and was interacting with his device when he struck the mother and
In other words, the tragic incident had apparently occurred during the app-on gap—the driver
was on the road with his Uber application activated, but had not yet connected with or picked
up a rider. So, who was responsible, the driver or the ride-hailing service?
Uber was, in the words of a New York Times columnist, “the hottest, most valuable technology
startup on the planet.” The company was founded in 2009 as “everyone’s private driver,”
providing a premium town car service that could be summoned online. In 2012, it rolled out
UberX, a service that enabled nonprofessional drivers to use their own vehicles to transport
riders. Customers could use the Uber app to hail a car, connect with a willing driver, watch the
vehicle approach on a map, pay their fare, and receive a receipt, all on their smartphone. Uber
provided the technology and took a commission on each transaction.
Uber’s disruptive business model caught on rapidly. By mid-2014, Uber’s ride-sharing service
had spread to more than 120 cities in 36 countries. In the United States, the ser- vice could
reach 137 million people with an average pickup time of less than 10 minutes. Demand was
growing so fast that Uber was scrambling to recruit 20,000 new drivers,
whom Uber called “transportation entrepreneurs,” every month. Private investors were
enthusiastic about the company’s prospects: Uber had attracted $1.2 billion in funding and
was valued at $18.2 billion.
Drivers who partnered with Uber had the flexibility to drive when and as much as they wished.
They could also make a decent living; the median annual income for its full-time drivers in San
Francisco, for example, was about $74,000. But they also assumed risk. In the event of an
accident, Uber instructed its drivers to submit a claim to their personal insurance carrier first.
If it was denied, Uber’s backup commercial liability insurance would go into effect, but only
after the driver had been summoned by a customer or had one in the vehicle.
Traditional taxicab companies did not welcome competition from Uber. Cabdrivers in many
cities across the world protested the entry of Uber into their markets, conducting strikes and
“rolling rallies” charging Uber with unfair practices. Uber drivers did not have to comply with
many of the rules that applied to taxicabs, such as those requiring commer- cial driver’s
licenses, regular mechanical inspections, and commercial liability insurance