Clearly define your terms and present arguments, not mere opinions or assertions, to defend your point of view. Utilize the text and point to specific examples and passages when appropriate. Write two peer replies by Sunday night at midnight.
Prompt 1: Define the relationship between attributes and modes in Book One of Spinoza’s Ethics. In doing so, attempt to answer the question: are attributes and modes identical to substance?
Essay: The Relationship Between Attributes and Modes in Spinoza’s Ethics, Book One
In Book One of Ethics, Baruch Spinoza constructs a rigorous metaphysical system grounded in a single infinite substance—God or Nature (Deus sive Natura). Understanding the relationship between attributes, modes, and substance is crucial to grasping his metaphysics. Attributes and modes are not identical to substance, though they are intimately connected with and dependent upon it. Rather, attributes are ways in which the intellect perceives the essence of substance, while modes are the particular modifications or expressions of substance through its attributes.
Spinoza defines substance in Proposition 1 as “that which is in itself and is conceived through itself” (Ethics, 1p1d). In other words, a substance is self-sufficient—it does not depend on anything else for its existence or its conception. In Proposition 11, he states, “God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists” (1p11). Thus, for Spinoza, there is only one substance: God.
Attributes are defined in Ethics 1d4 as “that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence.” They are not components or parts of substance, nor are they separate from it. Rather, they are the essential qualities or expressions through which the essence of the one substance (God) is understood. Importantly, Spinoza asserts that God has infinite attributes, but humans are only aware of two—thought and extension (1p10s). These are not modes or appearances, but essential aspects of the divine substance.
By contrast, modes are defined in 1d5 as “the affections of a substance, or that which is in something else and is conceived through something else.” Unlike substance, modes do not exist in and of themselves; they exist in and are conceived through substance. For example, individual ideas or bodies are modes of the attributes of thought and extension, respectively. In Proposition 15, Spinoza affirms this dependence: “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.”
Crucially, neither attributes nor modes are identical to substance. Although attributes are expressions of the essence of substance and modes are modifications of substance, they are conceptually and ontologically distinct. In Proposition 10, Spinoza writes, “Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.” This implies that attributes are self-contained expressions of substance but not substance in itself. Similarly, modes rely on substance for their existence and conception, making them ontologically dependent rather than independent entities.
To clarify with an analogy, we might think of substance as an infinite ocean. Attributes are the different lenses through which we can perceive the ocean (e.g., its surface color or its chemical composition), while modes are the waves and currents that occur within it. All three—the ocean, the lenses, and the waves—are interrelated, but only the ocean (substance) exists entirely in and through itself.
In conclusion, attributes and modes are not identical to substance in Spinoza’s system. Attributes are the ways the intellect perceives the essence of substance, while modes are particular expressions of substance through those attributes. Although not identical, both attributes and modes are inextricably linked to and dependent upon substance, making them essential for understanding the unity and diversity within Spinoza’s monistic ontology.
Peer Reply 1:
Hi [Peer Name],
I really appreciated your insight into how attributes and modes operate in Spinoza’s framework. You did a great job explaining that attributes reflect how the human mind perceives God’s essence. One thing I would expand on is the distinction between epistemological and ontological perspectives. While attributes are epistemological (how we know substance), modes are ontological (what actually exists as modifications of substance). This distinction helps clarify why Spinoza insists on substance’s unity despite the multiplicity of its expressions. What do you think about this dual aspect of his philosophy?
Best,
[Your Name]
Peer Reply 2:
Hi [Peer Name],
Your post raises an important question about whether modes can be thought of as parts of substance. I agree with your interpretation that they are not parts in a traditional sense, but rather expressions. Spinoza’s Proposition 25 in Book One supports this idea: “God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.” This means God doesn’t just create modes—they are the very activity of God’s essence expressing itself. It’s less like God creates things, and more like God is constantly unfolding in diverse forms. Thanks for sparking a thoughtful discussion!
Warm regards,
[Your Name]